In this paper, using a unique dataset of industrial firms obtained from enterprise surveys conducted across the Russian Federation in 2005 and 2009, we trace back structural changes in the corporate governance system before and after the global financial crisis. We also empirically examine the impacts of the crisis on the organization of boards of directors and audit systems. Our survey results reveal that, in the Russian industrial sector, the quality of corporate governance has been improved through the crisis. Furthermore, we found that, corresponding to the alignment hypothesis, in firms that decisively reformed their management and supervisory bodies in response to the 2008 financial shock, the total number of worker representative directors significantly declined, as did their proportion to all board members. On the other hand, we also found that, in firms that substantially reorganized their audit system to cope with the crisis, the independence of the audit system was undermined remarkably, corresponding to the expropriation hypothesis. Findings that management behaviors predicted by the two conflicting hypotheses are simultaneously detected-and that their targets are significantly different-deserve special mention. JEL classification numbers: D22; G01; G34; M42; P34
Introduction
It is widely believed that exogenous shock is a strong driver promoting the selection and evolution of firm organizations (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Langlois, 2007) . In the context of corporate governance system, the agency theory predicts that firms with governance structures that effectively motivate managers to maximize firm value perform better; therefore, their survivability in competitive markets is higher. In other words, drastic changes in the business environment that greatly expand market pressures accelerate the weeding out of firms with poorly functioning governance systems. In addition, differently from biological evolution, firms are able to adjust their own organs in response to environmental changes. Thus, self-organization toward an optimal governance system may occur within a firm to cope with management challenges associated with the given exogenous shock.
Studies that have empirically examined the above theoretical predictions, however, are quite limited despite Kole and Lehn's (1997) earnest call made two decades ago. One reason for this deficiency is the fact that exogenous shocks that cause large-scale firm selection and force surviving firms to drastically change their internal organization are historically scarce events. The economic shock caused by the global financial crisis of 2008 was more severe in post-socialist emerging markets than in the US and Western Europe. In particular, the crisis caused extremely profound economic damages in Russia. 2 In addition, the Russian corporate governance system in the pre-crisis period had considerable room for further improvement as compared to that of developed economies. Therefore, the empirical study of Russian firms has the advantage of capturing the impacts of the crisis more effectively ceteris paribus. In this sense, the Russian experience during the 2008 financial shock provides an invaluable opportunity to investigate the relationship between an exogenous shock and the selection and evolution of corporate governance systems.
Using this chance, Iwasaki (2014a) In fact, according to the UNCTAD, the real GDP growth rates of the US and of the 15 European Union (EU) member countries were -2.8% and -4.5%, respectively, in the year 2009. Meanwhile, in the same year, Central and Eastern European countries and Russia recorded sizable negative growth rates of -6.1% and -7.8%, respectively (http://unctad.org).
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The damage of the global financial crisis to the Russian economy is examined in a series of articles including: Tabata (2009) , Gaddy and Ickes (2010) , Nefedova et al. (2010) , Yakovlev et al. (2010) , Kuznetsov et al. (2011) , Osipian (2012) , and Klapper et al. (2013) .
2005 had a statistically robust and positive correlation with the company's subsequent survival probability. In this paper, we aim to tackle issues that present another side of the same coin dealt with in Iwasaki (2014a) . By examining the kinds of changes that occurred in the corporate governance bodies in surviving Russian firms and how the global financial crisis was related to these changes, we will provide evidence concerning the direction and extent of the impacts of the 2008 crisis on the self-organizational process of the corporate governance system. By achieving these research goals, this paper makes three contributions to the extant literature.
First, it provides new evidence regarding the extent and speed of the evolution of corporate governance systems, taking Russian firms as a laboratory case. To the best of our knowledge, recent studies that report time-series structural changes in corporate governance bodies using a firm-level data have been limited to Cornett et al. (2010) , Ezzine and Olivero (2013) , Black et al. (2014) , and Chen (2014) . Thus, current research does not allow us to discuss in detail how corporate governance systems evolve. The accumulation of empirical evidence is an urgent task in this research field. Using a unique dataset of Russian industrial firms obtained from enterprise panel surveys conducted across Russia in 2005 and 2009, we will extensively describe time-series changes in the Russian corporate governance system. Second, this study is the first to strictly discriminate the impact of the global financial crisis from historical trends on the evolution of corporate governance by distinguishing Russian firms that actually reacted to this financial shock.
The aforementioned studies- Cornett et al. (2010) , Ezzine and Olivero (2013) , and Chen (2014)-traced the changes in corporate governance systems before, during, and after the global financial crisis. For instance, Chen (2014) compared the corporate governance systems of listed Taiwanese companies during the three years (2005) (2006) (2007) before the global financial crisis with those during the three years ex post (2009) (2010) (2011) . Based on findings of ex-post improvement, Chen concluded that the 2008 crisis had a disciplinary effect on Taiwanese corporate governance.
However, the problem is that Chen's empirical approach makes it impossible to separate companies that reformed their corporate governance systems in response to the 2008 financial shock from other companies that did not. Therefore, she falls short of rigorously proving the corporate governance disciplinary effect of the crisis. Cornett et al. (2010) and Ezzine and Olivero (2013) also have the same problem.
In contrast, our 2009 follow-up survey included questionnaires designed to identify whether firms drastically reformed their management and supervisory bodies and/or audit systems in response to the global financial crisis. Therefore, the survey results enable us to identify among companies that actually took countermeasures against the crisis and to assess the genuine impact of the crisis on Russian corporate governance. Utilizing this information, we will overcome the methodological issue of the previous studies.
Third, we will propose two conflicting hypotheses regarding the impact of the global financial crisis on the independence from management of boards of directors and audit systems and will empirically compare the applicability of these hypotheses to the Russian economy. As we will discuss later, the alignment hypothesis and the expropriation hypothesis develop opposing arguments about the evolution of corporate governance in a financial crisis. In line with the aforementioned view of agency theorists, the alignment hypothesis predicts that a financial crisis tends to promote the organizational independence of corporate governance bodies to better align interests between managers and shareholders to cope with challenges associated with the crisis.
In contrast, based on the bitter lessons from the 1997 Asian currency crisis, the expropriation hypothesis suggests that a financial crisis may undermine the independence of corporate governance systems as a consequence of opportunistic and rent-seeking behaviors of a controlling shareholder and/or corporate officers in expropriating minority shareholders. It is valuable to empirically examine these contradictory predictions in order to resolve this crucial argument among financial economists.
Our survey results revealed that throughout the period of 2005-2009, the surviving firms enhanced their corporate governance system's independence from management, mainly by increasing the number of outside directors/auditors as an entire sample group. In this sense, the global financial crisis has improved the quality of corporate governance in the Russian industrial sector. However, the observed changes are sluggish, implying that the 2008 crisis did not drastically accelerate the evolution of corporate governance systems. Furthermore, we found that, in keeping with the alignment hypothesis, in firms that decisively reformed their management and supervisory bodies in response to the 2008 financial shock, the total number of worker representative directors significantly declined, as did their proportion to all board members. On the other hand, we also found that, in firms that substantially reorganized their audit systems to cope with the crisis, the total number of outside auditors and their proportion to all auditors declined, while the proportion of worker representative auditors increased. As a consequence, the overall independence of the audit system was undermined remarkably, corresponding with the expropriation hypothesis. Findings that management behaviors predicted by the two conflicting hypotheses are simultaneously detected within one country-and that their targets are significantly different-deserve special mention.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses possible impacts of an exogenous shock on the evolution of corporate governance systems and presents our testable hypothesis. Section 3 conducts an empirical analysis based on the results from our enterprise surveys. Section 4 examines the statistical robustness of the estimation results. Section 5 summarizes the major findings and concludes the paper.
Hypothesis Development: Alignment versus Expropriation
This section theoretically considers the possible impact of a strong exogenous shock, represented by the global financial crisis of 2008, on the evolutionary path of corporate governance systems and presents our testable hypothesis in the context of the Russian economy. Lehn (1997, 1999) published the first studies that thoroughly examined the impacts of drastic changes in the business environment on corporate governance systems. They argued that an exogenous shock that injects uncertainty and instability into the business environment would cause the governance structure of an affected firm to evolve in the direction of strengthening its monitoring and supervisory functions over top management. This is because such an exogenous shock enhances the importance of managerial decisions while, at the same time, increasing the costs of observing and evaluating the performance of management executives.
Consequently, relevant firms are forced to adjust their governance systems to mitigate new potential agency problems. Therefore, it is anticipated that, for instance, in the board of directors, the proportion of outside directors and/or independent directors to all board members will increase after an exogenous shock, given their important role in monitoring and supervising management.
In fact, Lehn (2003) reported that such interorganizational changes were actually observed among US telecommunications companies, which faced drastic deregulation implemented by the Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996. Perry and Shivdasani (2005) provide additional grounds for predicting that a company experiencing a management crisis will enhance the independence of its management and supervisory bodies. They documented that when business performance rapidly worsens, companies with a majority of outside directors on the corporate board are more likely to initiate asset restructuring and employment adjustments than are firms with a minority of outside directors, and that their subsequent improvement in operating performance is significantly higher than that of the latter. This suggests that firms with highly independent governance structures may excel in coping with management crises. In this regard, Perry and Shivdasani (2005) maintain that it is difficult to find a close relation between firm performance and board composition during tranquil times, since the board of directors' principal role is to monitor and supervise managers and not to run the company itself on a daily basis. In times of crisis, however, the board directors will substantially influence corporate management in order to keep the organization alive and help it emerge from its worsening business performance. In this sense, the corporate board is a "contingent" governance system (Aoki, 2000) . According to the bargaining model developed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) , the board of directors becomes increasingly independent as poor firm performance reduces CEOs' negotiating power (Francis et al., 2012) . We conjecture that this possibility further increases during a management crisis triggered by an exogenous shock.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Chen (2014) is one of the few works that directly addresses the issue of how the corporate governance system evolved during the global financial crisis. On the grounds of previous studies, including those of Kole and Lehn (1997; 1999) and Perry and Shivdasani (2005) , she predicted that "[a]fter coping with the rigorous business conditions during a financial crisis, increasing board independence after the financial crisis is a likely result," (p. 6) and empirically verified this hypothesis using data of 797 listed Taiwanese companies. Based on this result, Chen concluded that the global financial crisis inspired Taiwanese firms to adopt new governance structures that better align managerial interests with those of shareholders to cope with the tough business conditions. In the same vein, Ezzine and Olivero (2013) With regard to Russia, some empirical evidence is consistent with that from the studies mentioned above. In fact, Suvankulov and Ogucu (2012) The empirical findings of Suvankulov and Ogucu (2012) conform highly with the research outcomes of Iwasaki (2014a) , which verified that the independence of corporate boards and audit systems is robustly and positively correlated with the survival probability of Russian firms during the period from [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In this way, if better corporate governance was effective both for firm survival and preventing a firm's worsening performance during the crisis period, as maintained by Lehn (1997, 1999) and Chen (2014) , it is natural to predict that Russian firms that decided to reform their internal organizations in the wake of the 2008 financial shock are more likely to increase the independence of their corporate governance bodies. That is to say: Alignment hypothesis: Both the board of directors and the audit system become more independent in a company that reforms its corporate governance system as a countermeasure against a global financial crisis.
The above prediction accords with the alignment hypothesis, which claims that an exogenous shock will promote the evolution of corporate governance in an affected company toward better aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders. However, there is a conflicting 3 As Suvankulov and Ogucu (2012) did, from his empirical analysis of listed Polish companies, Kowalewski (2012) also verified the statistically significant and positive association of corporate governance index with Tobin's Q and the dividend payout ratio during the global financial crisis. theory, called the expropriation hypothesis (Claessens et al., 2000 (Claessens et al., , 2002 . Johnson et al. (2000) examined this counter hypothesis in the context of the Asian currency crisis. Their findings indicate that controlling shareholders and/or managers tend to expropriate minority shareholders more intensively during a financial crisis than at ordinary times. This is because the marginal opportunity cost of corporate asset expropriation substantially decreases when, due to the crisis, the return on investment falls considerably. For this reason, in emerging markets where the rights of minority shareholders are not sufficiently secured, firm value was broadly and significantly damaged both at the national and the company level due to asset tunneling during the financial crisis. Russia is no exception. Johnson et al. (2000) pointed out that " [t] he fact that management in most emerging markets is also the controlling shareholder makes these transfers easier to achieve. The downturns in these countries have been associated with significantly more expropriation of cash and tangible assets by managers" (p. 143).
As discussed above, the expropriation hypothesis, which advocates that in the face of a financial crisis large shareholders and/or managers abuse their control rights and expropriate minority shareholders, is strongly opposed to the alignment hypothesis, which predicts that firms will take measures to align interests between managers and shareholders to mitigate agency problems caused by a crisis. Inspired by these arguments, many empirical studies on the Asian currency crisis or the global financial crisis paid a great deal of attention to which hypothesis would be able to explain reality in the world more appropriately. However, as far as we surveyed, the number of studies that empirically support the expropriation hypothesis (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Baek et al., 2004; Kang et al., 2010; Erkens et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 2015) almost counterbalances the number of studies that endorse the alignment hypothesis (Mitton, 2002; Leung and Horwitz, 2010; Yeh et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2012) , just as empirical evidence regarding the effect of corporate governance on firm performance during a crisis period is really mixed.
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In sum, the debate remains unsettled. Accordingly, in Russia, where minority shareholders are not adequately protected in terms of both the legal system and company management practices (Filatotchev et al., 2001) , we consider that the expropriation hypothesis is likely to be validated.
Unfortunately, no studies have examined the impact of a financial crisis on the evolution of corporate governance from the standpoint of the expropriation hypothesis. Nevertheless, if large shareholders and/or managers scheme to tunnel corporate assets behind the backs of minority shareholders, they would reasonably try to undermine the independence of their company's corporate governance bodies, since these bodies would otherwise constitute a serious obstacle to 4 In addition to Suvankulov and Ogucu (2012) and Kowalewski (2012) , see Cornett et al. (2010) , Grove et al. (2010) , Aebi et al. (2012) , Francis et al. (2012) , Peni and Vähämaa (2012) , Ezzine and Olivero (2013) , Gupta et al. (2013) , McNulty et al. (2013 ), van Essen et al. (2013 , and Nguyen et al. (2015) , as well as O'Sullivan et al. (2015) . their attempts. In fact, according to a study on publicly traded US bank holding companies by Cornett et al. (2010) , corporate governance weakened significantly, especially among large firms, just before and during the global financial crisis. This implies that the internal monitoring function could actually be undermined at the very time when effective corporate governance seems most crucial. Other factors related to firm organization and/or management activities are also likely to have a certain impact on the evolutionary process of a corporate governance system. For this reason, we will control for these aspects when we empirically examine the above hypotheses. More specifically, we will focus on the following six factors related to firm organization as potential determinants of the corporate governance system of Russian firms: Nevertheless, it has been confirmed that these major banks not only undermined the corporate governance, but their adoption rate of the CEO's golden parachute rose remarkably. It cannot be ruled out that these movements might have stemmed from managers' opportunistic and rent-seeking behaviors. ownership tend to have more independent corporate governance bodies than do so-called independent firms; (d) Including a provision in the articles of incorporation that stipulates a certain upper limit on shareholding discourages the appointment of outside directors by restraining the voices of outside shareholders; (e) As compared to closed joint-stock companies and limited liability companies, open joint-stock companies have stronger intentions to construct more open corporate governance systems; (f) The corporate governance system tends to be more independent as company size increases.
In connection with the impact of management activity-related factors, the following arguments can be made: (a) Irrespective of the differences in countries and periods, many empirical studies have found that pressure to supervise management executives is relaxed in wellperforming companies; (b) Issuances of shares or bonds in the capital market and fund procurement from financial institutions inspire the relevant company to adopt an open corporate governance system that improves business transparency; (c) For the same reason, the internationalization of business has an effect similar to that of fund procurement; (d) On the other hand, R&D/innovation intensity tends to increase the need to evaluate management performance based on decision-making quality rather than financial performance because this kind of business activity carries technological uncertainty and high risk. Only in-house personnel are able to make this sort of performance evaluation. Accordingly, R&D/innovation intensity is negatively related to corporate governance bodies' independence from management.
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Table 1 summarizes our theoretical prediction based on the above discussion.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we will trace the changes in systems of Russian industrial firms' corporate governance before and after the global financial crisis and empirically examine the testable hypotheses presented in the previous section. Center of the Ministry of Labor) and its local branches to more than 800 large and medium-sized 6 See Iwasaki (2008 Iwasaki ( , 2009 Iwasaki ( , 2014b Iwasaki ( , 2014c for more detailed arguments about the effects of firm organization-and management activity-related factors on Russian corporate governance systems. We asked the 637 surviving firms to join our follow-up survey. Of these, 424 firms (or 66.6% of all surviving firms) accepted our request. The president (or CEO or general manager) or vice president accounted for 91.8% (389 persons) of the respondents. The remaining included 28 managers in charge of corporate governance issues (6.6%) and 7 board chairmen (1.7%). Valid responses were obtained from these 424 corporate executives. In the following two subsections, mainly using a dataset of the surviving firms surveyed in 2009, we will conduct an empirical analysis.
The Enterprise Survey

Univariate Analysis
In the 2009 follow-up survey, we asked the surviving firms whether they had substantially changed their corporate governance systems during the past five years and, if so, whether and how such changes were related to the global financial crisis. As Figure 2 shows, among the 404 firms that gave valid answers, 183 firms (45.3%) indicated a drastic change in their management and supervisory bodies (the board of directors, in particular), including 20 firms (5.0%) that reported that such changes represented organizational reform as their countermeasure against the 7 For more details on the 2005 survey, see Dolgopyatova et al. (2009, Appendix) . 8 For more details on these 104 exit firms, see Iwasaki (2014a The hypothesis is supported for variables related to outside directors and independent directors and those related to outside auditors and expert auditors as well as AUDSCO. These results correspond with the findings shown in Figure 3 .
We conducted the same examination, this time limiting observations to surveyed firms reporting substantial changes in their management and supervisory bodies or audit systems in response to the global financial crisis. The results, shown in Panel (b) of Table 4, indicate that firms that drastically reorganized the board of directors as a countermeasure against the crisis not only appointed more independent directors but also decreased the number of inside directors and worker representative directors. These results support the alignment hypothesis. Meanwhile, according to Panel (c) of the same table, in firms that had introduced considerable changes in their audit system to cope with the crisis, the audit firm attribute (AUDFIR) rose with a statistical significance that corresponds with the alignment hypothesis. However, at the same time, the proportion of outside auditors (AUDCOM), the proportion of expert auditors (AUDEXP), the total number of expert auditors (EXPAUD), and AUDSCO all decreased, while the proportion of worker representative auditors (AUDWOR), the total number of inside auditors (INSAUD), and the total number of worker representative auditors (WORAUD) all increased significantly. In other words, the behaviors observed in firms that had reorganized their audit systems during the crisis can be interpreted mostly with the expropriation hypothesis.
As described above, we found that Russian firms as a whole in the entire industrial sector improved the quality of their corporate governance system during the five years before and after the global financial crisis. This finding coincides with the empirical results for Taiwanese firms by Chen (2014) and those for French companies by Ezzine and Olivero (2013) . Moreover, we also revealed that firms that had substantially reformed their management and supervisory bodies or their audit systems to cope with the 2008 financial shock enhanced the independence of their boards of directors and employed audit firms with more desirable attributes. This evidence backs up the alignment hypothesis. However, we obtained empirical results that firms that had drastically reorganized their audit systems to tackle the crisis were more likely to have undermined the independence of their audit committees in line with the expropriation hypothesis.
In the next subsection, using multivariate regression analysis, we will examine whether the above results obtained from the univariate analysis can be reproduced even after we simultaneously control for other factors that may affect corporate governance structures.
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From this point of view, we tested the hypothesis that the respective total numbers and proportions of worker representative directors, inside directors, worker representative auditors, and inside auditors decreased during the observation period. We also tested the hypothesis that the value of the respective variables increased.
Multivariate Regression Analysis
Here, we will estimate a difference model, which is designed to analyze structural changes in a corporate governance system at two different times. Let us denote by y it the corporate governance where μ denotes a constant term; β and γ denote parameters; x is a time-varying independent variable, and z is a time-invariant independent variable; φ and ω denote, respectively, the fixed effects of the industry to which the i-th firm belongs and the firm-level individual effect; ε is an error term.
From Equation (1), we can obtain the difference model to be estimated as:
where δ represents a first-difference parameter to be estimated, while ∆ , ∆ , and ∆ . As indicated by the equation above, the difference model excludes any time-invariant variables and fixed effects, namely z, φ, and ω, as well as the constant term μ.
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In the left-hand side of Equation (2), we introduce a total of 18 types of variables-from the outsideness of the chairman of the board of directors (BOALEA) to the first principal component score for the audit system-related variables (AUDSCO)-as described in Subsection 3.2. To test the hypotheses, as shown in Panel (c) of Table 2 , we adopted two global financial crisis-related variables, consisting of a dummy for the firms that made significant changes in management and supervisory bodies in response to the crisis (CRISIS_BOD) and a dummy for the firms that made significant changes in their audit systems in response to the crisis (CRISIS_AUD) in the righthand side of the regression equation.
As discussed in Section 2, we simultaneously controlled for other factors with respect to firm organization and management activities that may affect the corporate governance structure. More specifically, we employed six types of firm organization-related variables-from the ownership share of outside shareholders (OWNOUT) to the average number of employees (COMSIZ)-and another six types of management activity-related variables-from labor productivity (LABPRO) to a dummy variable for the development of new products and services (NEWPRO)-as defined in Panels (d) and (e) of Table 2 , respectively.
Needless to say, the difference model also removes unobservable time-invariant factors.
For the empirical examination of the testable hypotheses proposed in Section 2, it is essential to perform regression analysis with consideration of a possible survival bias that might be caused by the exclusive use of samples that were not forced to exit the market during the observation period. To deal with this problem, the Heckman two-step estimation method was used. As a first step, we estimated a probit model of firm survival probability utilizing firm organization-related variables, management activity-related variables, and time-invariant dummy variables for privatized companies (PRICOM) and spin-off firms from a state-owned (municipal) company or privatized company (SPIOFF) 11 as well as industry fixed effects as independent variables. Then, in the second step, we added the inverse Mills ratio to the right-hand side of Equation (2) to control for the survival bias. If the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is statistically different from zero, a survival bias is judged to be present. Therefore, we concluded that the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-step estimation is sufficiently capable of adjusting for possible survival bias.
The estimates of global financial crisis-related variables clearly exhibit asymmetric impacts on the board of directors and audit system, corresponding with the results of the univariate analysis reported in Subsection 3.2. In fact, Panel (a) of Table 5 shows that CRISIS_BOD is estimated with a significant and negative coefficient in models that introduce BOAWOR and WORDIR into the left-hand side, suggesting that a Russian firm that has reformed its board of directors in the wake of the global financial crisis is highly likely to have reduced worker representative directors by 1.045 people, on average, while reducing their proportion to the board of directors by 13.2%. Finally, in all 18 models, the estimates of the inverse Mills ratio are not statistically significant. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that survival bias has virtually no influence on our estimation results.
Robustness Check
As described above, we conducted an empirical analysis that explicitly dealt with a survival bias that might be caused by using only samples that survived the global financial crisis; we confirmed the insignificance of its influence on the estimation results. However, as indicated in Table 6 show, in terms of board of director-related variables and audit system-related variables, there are no statistically significant differences between the two sample groups for 14 of 16 variables. The remaining two variables, INSAUD and WORAUD, show significant differences, in the sense that the mean values of the unsurveyed firms exceed those of the 2009 surveyed firms. Nevertheless, the difference in each variable is below 1.0 and, thus, cannot be said to be substantially remarkable.
We also made the same comparison between firm organization-related variables and management activity-related variables. As Panels (c) and (d) of Table 6 show, statistically significant differences are found in three variables-LIMOWN, LABPRO, and EXPSHA. The mean values of these three variables imply that, as compared to the 2009 surveyed firms, the unsurveyed firms are less likely to stipulate in their articles of incorporation upper limits on the ownership of shares; their labor productivity and share of exports in total sales also tend to be higher than those of their counterparts. Nevertheless, these differences are not particularly large.
To further examine this problem, we performed complementary regressions by replacing the observations of the exit firms with those of the 2009 unsurveyed firms; this confirmed that the estimation results were not much different from those in Table 5 , and the inverse Mills ratios are all insignificant. Taking into account results from the univariate comparison in Table 6 as well as the above complementary regression estimates, we inferred that the omission of samples that resulted from the dropping of 213 surviving firms from the follow-up survey in 2009 does not cause any serious bias in our empirical results. Furthermore, to check the overall robustness of the empirical results, we conducted a supplemental estimation, in which various sample restrictions were placed on the regression models, and confirmed that these sample restrictions do not substantially change our major findings. More concretely, supplementary regressions were performed with the following four settings: (1) excluding fuel/energy and metallurgy companies, which are subject to unique government regulations regarding firm organization and business activities; (2) limiting the samples to those with company sizes within the mean ±1 standard deviation so that very large enterprises are excluded from the observations; (3) limiting the samples to companies that did not issue securities in 2005; (4) limiting the samples to firms that were non-group-affiliated (i.e., independent firms) in 2005.
The above findings led to the conclusion that the estimation results reported in this paper are fairly robust across the various specifications.
Conclusions
In this paper, using a unique dataset of industrial firms obtained from enterprise panel surveys conducted across Russia in 2005 and 2009, we traced structural changes in the corporate governance system before and after the global financial crisis. We also empirically examined impacts of the crisis on the structures of boards of directors and audit systems.
Our survey results reveal that throughout the period of 2005-2009, surviving firms enhanced the independence from management of their corporate governance system, mainly by increasing the number of outside directors/auditors of the entire sampling group. In this sense, in the Russian industrial sector, the quality of corporate governance was improved before and after the 2008 financial shock, as monitored by Chen (2014) in Taiwan and Ezzine and Olivero (2013) in France.
The observed changes, however, cannot be considered drastic. Rather, as Kole and Lehn (1997) stated, change in the governance structure "occurs more slowly than many economists might imagine" (p. 424). We conjecture that path-dependency and interorganizational frictions are very influential factors in the evolutionary process of corporate governance systems.
Moreover, based on the results of the 2009 follow-up survey, we identified Russian firms that had drastically reformed their corporate governance systems in the wake of the global financial crisis and then investigated structural changes in the boards of directors and the audit systems of these firms. The empirical results in Section 3 revealed that, corresponding with the alignment hypothesis, in firms that decisively reformed their management and supervisory bodies in response to the unprecedented macroeconomic shock, the total number of worker representative directors, whose presence is regarded as harmful to efficient corporate management, significantly declined, as did their proportion to all board members. On the other hand, we also found that, in firms that substantially reorganized their audit systems to cope with the crisis, the total number of outside auditors and their proportion to all auditors declined, while the proportion of worker representative auditors increased. As a consequence, the overall independence of the audit system was undermined remarkably, corresponding with the expropriation hypothesis.
The findings that management behaviors predicted by the two conflicting hypotheses are simultaneously detected within one country-and that their targets are significantly differentare noteworthy. We infer that this evidence is closely related to the fact that the board of directors mainly functions as a mechanism to coordinate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, while the audit system more purely serves to monitor and control firm assets.
Moreover, the empirical results in this paper also revealed that the number and organizational behavior of Russian firms that have actually reacted to the global financial crisis are relatively limited, contrary to our expectations. This fact implies the possibility that, since the election and termination of board directors and auditors are the responsibility of the general shareholders, who should meet in the first half of the year in accordance with the federal law regarding joint-stock companies, most Russian firms could not take any concrete action in response to the 2008 crisis until the 2009 general meeting of shareholders, and the scope of realized organizational reforms was also quite constrained. In this sense, this paper provides valuable insight to understanding the above-mentioned statement by Kole and Lehn (1997) Table 1 . Theoretical prediction of determinants of the independence of board of directors and audit system from management Note: This table summarizes theoretical predictions of the impact of potential factors on the independence of the board of directors and the audit system from management on the basis of the discussion in Section 2 of the paper. The sign '+' denotes a positive correlation between a given factor and the independece of the corporate governance system; '-' indicates a negative correlation, '?' means that impact is unpredictable. Dummy for firms that issued shares or bonds in overseas or domestic stock exchanges ( d Proportion of the concerned directors to the total number of board of director members, with a range 0.00≤x≤1.00 as a continuous variable e Estimated using the nine board of director-related variables above. See Panel (a) in Table 3 for the major estimation results. f Proportion of the concerned auditors to the total number of audit committee members, with a range 0.00≤x≤1.00 as a continuous variable h Estimated using the above nine audit system-related variables. See Panel (b) in Table 3 for the major estimation results.
i Ownership share of outside institutional shareholders rated on the following 6-point scale: 0-0%; 1-10.0% or less; 2-10.1 to 25.0%; 3-25.1 to 50.0%; 4-50.1 to 75.0%; 5-75.1 to 100.0% j The natural logarithm of average number of total employees each year k The natural logarithm of the real sales per worker based on the 2005 price m " Share of exports in total sales" falls under one of the following 6 categories: 0-0%; 1-10% or less; 2-10.1 to 25.0%; 3-25.1 to 50.0%; 4-50.1 to 75.0%; 5-More than 75%. n Evaluation of the R&D expenditures during the last 4 years falls under one of the following three categories: 0-No record; 1-R&D expenditures remained flat or on the decline, and 2-R&D expenditures on the increase. o Results in last 4 years Source: Results from the 2005 and 2009 enterprise surveys l " Firms that used bank credits and their average lending period" fall under one of the following 6 categories: 0-Did not use any bank credits during the period from 2001-2004; 1-Used bank credits, and their average lending period was less than 3 months; 2-Used bank credits, and their average lending period ranged from 3 months to less than 6 months; 3-Used bank credits, and their average lending period ranged from 6 months to less than one year; 4-Used bank credits, and their average lending period ranged from one year to less than 3 years; 5-Used bank credits, and their average lending period was more than 3 years. c An ordinal variable that assigns a value of 0 to a firm where the chairman of the board of directors has been appointed from the inside, a value of 1 to a firm where the chairman is a quasi-outsider appointed from those working in an affiliated business group or a business partner, and a value of 2 to a firm where the chairman has been appointed from the outside g An ordinal variable that assigns a value of 0 to a firm that employs an indigenous Russian audit firm as its accounting auditor, a value of 1 to a firm that employs a non-indigenous Russian audit firm, and a value of 2 to a firm that employs an international audit firm Source: Author's illustration. See Table 2 for definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in estimation. 
